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Abstract14
Cooperation is ubiquitous in biological and social systems, even though cooperative be-15
havior is often costly and at risk of exploitation by non-cooperators. Several studies16
have demonstrated that indirect reciprocity, whereby some members of a group observe17
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the behaviors of their peers and use this information to discriminate against previously18
uncooperative agents in the future, can promote prosocial behavior. Some studies have19
shown that differential propensities of interacting among and between different types20
of agents (interaction assortment) can increase the effectiveness of indirect reciprocity.21
No previous studies have, however, considered differential propensities of observing the22
behaviors of different types of agents (information assortment). Furthermore, most pre-23
vious studies have assumed that discriminators possess perfect information about others24
and incur no costs for gathering and storing this information. Here, we (1) consider both25
interaction assortment and information assortment, (2) assume discriminators have lim-26
ited information about others, and (3) introduce a cost for information gathering and27
storage, in order to understand how the ability of discriminators to stabilize cooperation28
is affected by these steps toward increased realism. We report the following findings.29
First, cooperation can persist when agents preferentially interact with agents of other30
types or when discriminators preferentially observe other discriminators, even when31
they have limited information. Second, contrary to intuition, increasing the amount32
of information available to discriminators can exacerbate defection. Third, introducing33
costs of gathering and storing information makes it more difficult for discriminators to34
stabilize cooperation. Our study broadens the set of circumstances in which it is known35
that cooperation can be maintained and is one of only a few studies to date that show36
how negative interaction assortment can promote cooperation.37
38
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Introduction40
The persistence of cooperation in biological and social systems is an evolutionary puzzle,41
because one would naively expect that, among cooperators who contribute their own re-42
sources to help other members of their group and defectors who do not, the defectors43
will do better and increase in numbers at the expense of the cooperators. This intuition is44
captured by simple models of evolutionary game theory predicting the demise of coop-45
eration and the domination of defection. Nevertheless, cooperation is widespread across46
biological and social systems, and many mechanisms have been proposed to explain47
why. Several of these, including ostracism (Tavoni et al., 2012), punishment (Nowak,48
2006), and reciprocity (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Killingback & Doebeli, 2002; Pan-49
chanathan & Boyd, 2003; Nowak, 2006; Ohtsuki & Iwasa, 2006; Pacheco et al., 2006), rely50
on members of a group using information to discriminate in their behavior toward their51
peers. Such agents are called discriminators, as opposed to cooperators and defectors,52
who do not change their behaviors based on such information. But even among humans,53
individuals rarely—if ever—have perfect and complete information about all members of54
their social groups. Nor do they observe and interact with their peers entirely randomly.55
It is therefore important to understand how assortment within groups and constraints56
on the available information impacts the evolution of cooperation.57
A commonly considered strategy for discriminators to use the information they have58
about their peers is to behave reciprocally, being more likely to cooperate with agents59
whom they expect to cooperate. Direct reciprocity is possible when pairs of agents en-60
gage in repeated interactions (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Killingback & Doebeli, 2002;61
Nowak, 2006), so that paired agents can base their future behaviors on the past behav-62
iors of their partners that they have experienced directly. In contrast, reciprocity is indi-63
rect when discriminators use information about the interactions between other pairs of64
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agents, rather than memories of their own interactions, to decide how to behave. Indirect65
reciprocity can explain the persistence of cooperation even in groups whose members66
are unlikely to repeatedly interact with each other, and has thus frequently been used to67
model the evolution of cooperation (e.g., Nowak & Sigmund, 1998a,b; Panchanathan &68
Boyd, 2003; Brandt & Sigmund, 2004, 2006; Ohtsuki & Iwasa, 2006; Pacheco et al., 2006;69
Uchida, 2010; Uchida & Sigmund, 2010; Nakamura & Masuda, 2011). (For discussions70
of direct reciprocity, see e.g., Killingback & Doebeli, 2002 and Nowak, 2006.)71
Many existing models assume that there is no group structure, so that each agent is72
equally likely to encounter every other. However, few—if any—real biological groups73
are perfectly well-mixed. If members of a group inherit their behavioral strategies from74
their parents and do not move far from where they are born, the group will comprise75
patches of agents with similar behaviors. Structure can also arise if members of a group76
move away from agents who have defected against them (Hamilton & Taborsky, 2005)77
or away from parts of the environment that have been depleted by defectors (Pepper &78
Smuts, 2002). Each of these mechanisms could lead to different frequencies of interact-79
ing with cooperators, defectors, and discriminators, resulting in what we call interaction80
assortment. Positive interaction assortment has been shown to be effective for promot-81
ing cooperation (e.g., Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Pepper & Smuts, 2002; Panchanathan82
& Boyd, 2004; Doebeli & Hauert, 2005; Fletcher & Doebeli, 2006; Ackermann et al., 2008;83
Rankin & Taborsky, 2009; Ghang & Nowak, 2015; Roberts, 2015; for an exception see84
Hauert & Doebeli, 2004), while negative interaction assortment tends to inhibit cooper-85
ation (Fletcher & Doebeli, 2006; West & Gardner, 2010; Smead & Forber, 2013; Forber &86
Smead, 2014).87
Any mechanism that leads to interaction assortment could also lead to different fre-88
quencies of observing cooperators, defectors, and discriminators, resulting in what we89
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call information assortment, which has not previously been studied. Furthermore, only a90
handful of studies have considered limited information, and these studies do not explic-91
itly model the process of information gathering and storing (e.g. Kreps et al., 1982;92
Nowak & Sigmund, 1998a,b; Panchanathan & Boyd, 2003; Brandt & Sigmund, 2006;93
Nakamura & Masuda, 2011). With the exception of Kreps et al. (1982), who assumed94
that co-players do not always select the most rational strategy among those available95
to them, the few studies that considered indirect reciprocity under limited information96
assumed that each discriminator knows the last action of a fraction of its group at each97
point in time (e.g. Nowak & Sigmund, 1998a,b; Panchanathan & Boyd, 2003; Nakamura98
& Masuda, 2011). Limited information is thus described only phenomenologically, since99
the process by which discriminators collect such information is not considered. These100
earlier descriptions are also memory-less, since only behaviors at the last point in time101
is allowed to affect the discriminators’ assessments and resultant behaviors. Finally,102
most models of indirect reciprocity ignore the costs incurred by discriminators for their103
information-related behaviors (but see Brandt & Sigmund, 2006). In reality, however,104
gathering and storing information can be costly, since it takes time and energy to engage105
in those activities, as has been studied in ecology, animal behavior, economics, and neu-106
roscience (Nelson, 1970; Waddington, 1985; Laughlin et al., 1998; Laughlin, 2001; MacIver107
et al., 2010).108
In this paper, we investigate how interaction assortment, information assortment,109
limited information, and costly information affect the ability of discriminators to stabi-110
lize cooperation. To study the dynamics of a group consisting of cooperators, defectors,111
and discriminators using indirect reciprocity, we extend the influential model of Nowak112
& Sigmund (1998b). In this model, three types of agents—cooperators, defectors, and113
discriminators—interact with each other for several rounds, during which discrimina-114
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tors cooperate with other agents that have recently cooperated and defect otherwise. We115
incorporate interaction assortment by allowing each type of agent to interact more or less116
frequently with other agents of the same type, and we incorporate information assort-117
ment by allowing discriminators to observe other discriminators more or less frequently118
than they observe the other types. Additionally, we incorporate limited information by119
restricting the number of observations that discriminators can make and by allowing120
discriminators to forget their observations of behaviors occurring more than one time121
step ago. Finally, we impose costs on the discriminators for their information-related122
behavior.123
We find that cooperation can be stabilized by the presence of discriminators, provided124
that the discriminators preferentially interact with other types of agents or preferentially125
observe other discriminators, even when the discriminators have limited information.126
Surprisingly, making more information available to discriminators sometimes makes it127
harder for them to protect a cooperative group from invasion by defectors. Finally, we128
find that it becomes more difficult for discriminators to stabilize cooperation if they have129
to pay costs for gathering and storing information.130
Model description131
We model a group of agents who cooperate to differing extents: cooperators always co-132
operate, defectors never cooperate, and discriminators use information about their peers133
to decide whether to cooperate or to defect. All agents interact with each other and134
receive payoffs according to their own behavior and the behaviors of the agents they135
interact with. These payoffs then determine how the frequencies of the three types of136
agents change over time, with agents that receive higher payoffs becoming more fre-137
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quent. In the following sections, we describe the agents and how they interact; how138
discriminators gather, store, and use information; how the expected payoff for each type139
of agent is calculated; and how these payoffs affect the frequencies of the types of agents.140
Interaction dynamics141
Following Nowak & Sigmund (1998b), we model cooperative interactions using the do-142
nation game. When two agents interact, each agent in the pair is given the opportunity143
to donate to its partner. If he chooses to donate, the recipient receives a benefit b and144
the donor incurs a cost c. If he chooses not to donate, neither agent’s payoff changes.145
There are three types of agents. Cooperators always donate, defectors never donate,146
and discriminators decide whether or not to donate based on what they know about the147
recipient. We denote the frequency of cooperators in the group by x1, that of defectors148
by x2, and that of discriminators by x3. We model a group that is sufficiently large (or149
in mathematical terms, infinitely large) that these quantities can take any value between150
0 and 1. The set of combinations (x1, x2, x3) with x1, x2, x3 ≥ 0 and x1 + x2 + x3 = 1 is151
called the two-dimensional simplex.152
The agents play the game for R rounds. Agents can be more or less likely to interact153
with other agents of the same type than with other types, or equally likely to interact154
with all types, depending on the assumed degree of what we call interaction assortment.155
Specifically, we assume that an agent is more likely by a factor aint to interact with an-156
other agent of the same type than with either one of the other two types. For example,157
given that a discriminator engages in an interaction, he interacts with a cooperator with158
probability x1/(x1 + x2 + aintx3), with a defector with probability x2/(x1 + x2 + aintx3),159
or with another discriminator with probability aintx3/(x1 + x2 + aintx3). Interaction prob-160
abilities for the other two types are defined analogously. When aint = 1, the group is161
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well mixed with regard to interactions, so any agent interacts with each of the three162
types with probabilities equaling their frequencies in the group. When aint > 1, the163
group is positively assorted with regard to interactions, with agents being more likely to164
interact with agents of the same type, whereas when aint < 1, the group is negatively as-165
sorted with regard to interactions, with agents being more likely to interact with agents166
of different types.167
Information dynamics168
Discriminators observe other agents’ behaviors and use those observations to update169
their opinions about the reputations of those other agents. Discriminators can be more,170
less, or equally likely to observe discriminators as other types, depending on the as-171
sumed degree of what we call information assortment. Specifically, a discriminator is172
more likely by a factor ainf to observe another discriminator than either of the other173
two interaction types. In each round of the game, a discriminator makes several ob-174
servations. For each observation, he chooses to observe a cooperator with probability175
x1/(x1 + x2 + ainfx3), a defector with probability x2/(x1 + x2 + ainfx3), and a discrimina-176
tor with probability ainfx3/(x1 + x2 + ainfx3). In total, a discriminator observes a fraction177
po of all agents in the group. As fractions of the group, pox1/(x1 + x2 + ainfx3) are178
cooperators that are observed by a focal discriminator, pox2/(x1 + x2 + ainfx3) are ob-179
served defectors, poainfx3/(x1 + x2 + ainfx3) are observed discriminators, and 1− po go180
unobserved.181
Note that the fraction of agents a discriminator can observe depends on the infor-182
mation assortment: if there are very few discriminators present in the group and a183
discriminator concentrates its observations on those few discriminators (ainf >> 1), he184
can observe only a small fraction of the group. Similarly, if the group comprises mostly185
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discriminators and a discriminator concentrates its observations on cooperators and de-186
fectors (ainf << 1), he can only observe a small fraction of the group. To ensure that187
discriminators can observe their peers with probability po for all group compositions,188
i.e., for all values of x1, x2, and x3, we therefore require po ≤ min{ainf, 1/ainf}. Details189
on deriving these bounds on po are described in the Supporting Information, Section S1.190
Based on these considerations, one might expect that aint would constrain interactions in191
a similar way. However, each agent interacts with only one other agent in a given round,192
and in an infinitely large group one agent merely constitutes an infinitesimal propor-193
tion of the whole group. Thus, the “probability of interacting” is essentially 0, which194
is always less than or equal to min{aint, 1/aint}, and the required degree of interaction195
assortment can therefore always be achieved.196
After each round, a discriminator classifies every other agent as good, bad, or un-197
known. When a discriminator has observed another agent cooperating, he updates his198
opinion of that agent to be good (i.e., to have a good reputation), and when a discrim-199
inator has observed another agent defecting he updates his opinion of that agent to be200
bad (i.e., to have a bad reputation), which is the image-scoring method of reputation201
updating used by Nowak & Sigmund (1998b). If a discriminator has never observed202
the other agent, he considers him to be unknown. Moreover, to describe the effects of203
memory loss on reputation information, each agent that is known to a discriminator204
at time t− 1 is independently remembered with probability pr and becomes unknown205
with probability 1− pr at time t. In the Supporting Information, Section S2, we derive206
expressions for the probability of being known to a discriminator and for the probability207
that a discriminator is considered to be good.208
As in the model of Nowak & Sigmund (1998b), a discriminator cooperates with any209
agent he considers to be good, defects against any agent he considers to be bad, and210
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cooperates with probability pc with unknown agents. In the case of perfect information,211
Brandt & Sigmund (2004) call this the “CO action rule”, since it relies only on the repu-212
tation of a discriminator’s co-player. For our analyses, we use pc = 0.5. If the interaction213
and assortment parameters allow for the existence of a stable cooperative equilibrium214
when pc = 0.5, it will also exist for a wide range of values of pc less than 1. In the ex-215
treme case described by pc = 1, there will not be a unique cooperative equilibrium, but216
discriminators can still prevent the invasion of defectors, so our conclusions for pc = 0.5217
carry over even to this extreme case. We provide further details about the sensitivity of218
our model to this parameter in the section entitled Robustness and in the Supporting219
Information, Section S4 and Figures S4-S7.220
In previous models of indirect reciprocity (e.g., Panchanathan & Boyd, 2003; Brandt221
& Sigmund, 2004, 2006), discriminators sometimes committed “errors,” whereby a dis-222
criminator either does not cooperate when intending to do so (implementation error)223
or does not correctly perceive a partner’s reputation (assessment error). In either case,224
a discriminator may defect against a cooperator. In our model, this possibility is in-225
corporated through limited information: if a cooperator is unknown to a discriminator,226
the discriminator may defect against it. We do not separately incorporate errors into227
our model in order to keep a clear focus on the effects of limited information, without228
having to disentangle them from the effects of errors. While the possibility of a discrim-229
inator committing an error can undermine the stability of cooperation under indirect230
reciprocity (Panchanathan & Boyd, 2003), it does not always do so (Brandt & Sigmund,231
2004, 2006). Similarly, we find that limited information can destabilize cooperation, but232
that the limits on information have to be severe to do so, as we show below.233
To impose costs on discriminators for gathering and storing information, a cost s ≥ 0234
is deducted, once at the end of the R rounds of interactions, from the payoff a discrimi-235
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nator has accrued from those interactions.236
Payoff dynamics237
The expected payoffs for each of the three types depend on the frequency x1 of cooper-238
ators, the frequency x2 of defectors, and the frequency x3 of discriminators. Since the239
discriminators’ behaviors depend on their opinions about other agents, an agent’s ex-240
pected payoff also depends on the probability that a discriminator will have an opinion241
about him or her. When a discriminator has an opinion, he will always assess a coop-242
erator as good and a defector as bad. The probability that a discriminator has a good243
opinion about another discriminator thus depends on the behaviors observed by the dis-244
criminator, and hence on the frequencies of the three types. In general, the expected245


















We derive expressions for the expected payoffs of each type of agent in the Supporting250
Information, Section S3.251
Replicator dynamics252
We are interested in the dynamics of the frequencies of the three types, x1, x2, and x3.253
These dynamics are given by the standard replicator equations, ddtxi = xi(Pi − P¯), where254
P¯ = ∑i xiPi is the average payoff in the group. Hence, the frequencies of types are255
equilibrated when, for each type i, either xi = 0 or Pi = P¯.256
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Results257
The replicator dynamics resulting from our model can reach seven types of equilibria.258
There are always three pure equilibria, at which the group consists entirely of one type259
of agent. The pure cooperator equilibrium is always unstable. The pure defector equi-260
librium is always stable. The pure discriminator equilibrium is always a saddle: either a261
group of discriminators can be invaded by cooperators, but not by defectors, or a group262
of discriminators can be invaded by defectors, but not by cooperators, depending on263
the parameters of the model. There are also four possible “mixed” equilibria: three of264
these correspond to groups that consist of two types of agents, and one is an “interior”265
equilibrium, corresponding to a group in which all three types of agents are present.266
The cooperator-discriminator equilibrium, when it exists, is maintained by mutual inva-267
sibility and is always stable along the cooperator-discriminator edge of the simplex: in268
a group mostly made up of discriminators, cooperators receive more benefits than dis-269
criminators, who might be perceived as bad by their peers, while in a group mostly made270
up of cooperators, discriminators pay lower costs than cooperators, who always donate.271
The existence and stability of the cooperative equilibria, that is, equilibria in which co-272
operators are present, depend on how assorted the group is, how the discriminators273
gather and store information, and how large the costs associated with these behaviors274
are. By analyzing how the replicator dynamics depend on these factors, we find that (1)275
cooperation is stabilized when the group has negative interaction assortment or positive276
information assortment or both, even if the discriminators have limited information; (2)277
increasing the probabilities of observing and/or remembering can help defectors invade,278
and (3) costly information can jeopardize cooperation. We now describe each of these279
findings in turn.280
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Assortment can stabilize cooperation281
If there is no assortment (ainf = aint = 1), defection will always come to dominate the282
group. When the group starts with a sufficient fraction of discriminators, it will come to283
cycle around a neutral interior equilibrium: discriminators first increase at the expense284
of defectors, then cooperators increase at the expense of discriminators, and then defec-285
tors increase by taking advantage of cooperators, and the cycle continues (Figure 1D).286
However, if there is a big enough perturbation, the group can be moved into a regime287
where defection takes over (Figure 1D) (Nowak & Sigmund, 1998b). In the Supporting288
Information, Figure S1, we show that the neutral interior equilibrium is the only pos-289
sible mixed equilibrium when ainf = aint = 1, regardless of how much information the290
discriminators have. If the discriminators do not have sufficient information, even this291
interior equilibrium does not exist and no perturbation is required for defectors to take292
over (Supporting Information, Figure S1).293
With sufficient positive interaction assortment (i.e., far enough to the right to be in the294
purple region of Figure 1A), a stable and an unstable cooperator-defector equilibrium295
appear together (as can be seen in the transition from Figure 1D to Figure 1F). Defectors296
can always invade the pure cooperator equilibrium, since they accrue higher payoffs297
than cooperators: as long as defectors are rare, both types essentially interact only with298
cooperators, but defectors save the cost of cooperating. However, when a significant299
fraction of the group consist of defectors, a cooperator receives a higher payoff than a300
defector, because the cooperator frequently interacts with other cooperators, offsetting301
the costs he has to pay for cooperating, while the defector frequently interacts with other302
defectors. These forces are balanced at the two cooperator-defector equilibria.303
Positive interaction assortment cannot stabilize the cooperator-discriminator equilib-304
rium. Rather, this can be achieved by reducing interaction assortment or increasing in-305
13
Figure 1: Assortment, either in information or in interaction, is necessary, but not suf-
ficient, to stabilize cooperation. In the upper panel (A), we show how the replicator
dynamics depend on the degrees of information assortment ainf and interaction assort-
ment aint. The axes are scaled logarithmically. The dashed line shows where ainf = aint.
The parameter space is colored according to the most cooperative outcome of the repli-
cator dynamics that occurs for a given combination of these parameters. A group made
up entirely of defectors is always at a stable equilibrium. In the white region, it is the
only stable equilibrium, although a neutral interior equilibrium exists. In the dark-blue
region, there is a stable cooperator-discriminator equilibrium. In the light-blue region,
there is a stable equilibrium at which all three types are present. Caption continued
below. 14
Figure 1: In the purple region, there is a stable cooperator-defector equilibrium. In the
phase portraits (B)-(F), trajectories show how the frequencies of cooperators, defectors,
and discriminators change over time. The lower left corner of the simplex represents a
group made up entirely of cooperators, the lower right corner a group made up entirely
of defectors, and the upper corner a group made up entirely of discriminators. The
colors in the simplices indicate the basins of attraction of the stable equilibria or a region
in which trajectories cycle around a neutral center. Unstable equilibria are indicated with
white circles, stable equilibria with black circles, saddles with half white and half black
circles, and neutral centers with gray circles. Parameters: in B, aint = 0.93, ainf = 0.93;
in C, aint = 0.98, ainf = 0.98; in D, aint = 1, ainf = 1; in E, aint = 1.005, ainf = 1.17; in F,
aint = 1.24, ainf = 1.17; in all panels, po = 0.85, pr = 0.95, R = 10, b = 10, c = 1, pc = 0.5,
and s = 0.
formation assortment. Reducing interaction assortment results in a stable interior equi-306
librium at which all three types are present (as seen in the transition from Figure 1D to307
Figure 1C). As aint is reduced further, more and more discriminators can invade a group308
starting from the pure cooperator equilibrium, since the discriminators are receiving309
higher and higher payoffs from frequently interacting with cooperators. Eventually, the310
frequency of discriminators at the cooperator-discriminator equilibrium is high enough311
that the discriminators can prevent defectors from invading and the equilibrium is sta-312
bilized (as seen in the transition from Figure 1C to Figure 1B).313
As information assortment increases, discriminators know more about other discrim-314
inators than about cooperators and therefore give more donations to discriminators and315
fewer to cooperators. This increases the payoffs that discriminators receive in the absence316
of defectors, allowing more discriminators to invade the pure cooperator equilibrium, to317
the point until there are enough discriminators to prevent defectors from invading (as318
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seen in the transition form Figure 1D to Figure 1E). Details about these bifurcations are319
provided in the Supporting Information, Section S5. If we only consider situations in320
which the two types of assortment are equal, they both need to be negative in order for321
cooperation to be stabilized (as seen by moving along the dashed diagonal line in Figure322
1).323
The degree of either interaction assortment or information assortment required to324
stabilize the cooperator-discriminator equilibrium (which can be seen in the distance325
between the point D and the dark-blue region in Fig 1A) decreases as the number R of326
rounds increases, and in the limit of infinitely many rounds no assortment is required to327
stabilize this equilibrium (Supporting Information, Figure S2). The robustness of these328
results to changing the probability pc of cooperating and the benefit b of receiving a329
donation are discussed below, in the section entitled Robustness.330
Even limited information can stabilize cooperation331
For discriminators to operate and to be able to stabilize cooperation, the probabilities po332
of observing and pr of remembering both need to exceed 0 (Figure 2A). Increasing po333
and pr from 0 decreases the benefits defectors receive from discriminators to whom they334
are unknown. When po and pr are sufficiently high, a stable cooperator-discriminator335
equilibrium appears (as seen in the transition from Figure 2B to Figure 2C). Details about336
these bifurcations are provided in the Supporting Information, Section S5.337
For a stable equilibrium to exist at which cooperators are present, the probabilities338
po and pr need not be very high, and the higher the one the lower the other may be (see339
the boundary between the red and dark-blue regions in Figure 2A). Thus, even limited340
information can stabilize cooperation. In fact, the more rounds the group plays and the341
greater the benefit of cooperation, the less information is needed to stabilize cooperation342
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Figure 2: Even limited information can stabilize cooperation. In the upper panel (A),
we show how the replicator dynamics depend on the two characteristics of the process
of information gathering and storing, given by the probabilities po of observing and
pr of remembering. The horizontal axis extends until po = ainf, beyond which po is not
meaningful (see the Supporting Information, Section S1). The parameter space is colored
according to the most cooperative outcome of the replicator dynamics that occurs for a
given combination of these parameters. A group made up entirely of defectors is always
at a stable equilibrium. In the red region, it is the only stable equilibrium. In the dark-
blue region, there is a stable cooperator-discriminator equilibrium. In the light-blue
region, there is a stable equilibrium at which with all three types are present. Caption
continued below. 17
Figure 2: In the phase portraits (B)-(D), trajectories show how the frequencies of coopera-
tors, defectors, and discriminators change over time. The lower left corner of the simplex
represents a group made up entirely of cooperators, the lower right corner a group made
up entirely of defectors, the upper corner a group made up entirely of discriminators.
The colors in the simplices indicate the basins of attraction of the stable equilibria. Un-
stable equilibria are indicated with white circles, stable equilibria with black circles, and
saddles with half white and half black circles. Parameters: in B, pr = 0.25, po = 0.3; in
C, pr = 0.6, po = 0.3; in D, pr = 1, po = 0.3; in all panels, aint = ainf = 0.93, R = 10,
b = 10, c = 1, pc = 0.5, and s = 0.
(Supporting Information, Figure S3).343
Increasing the probabilities of observing or remembering can help de-344
fectors invade345
Surprisingly, if the probabilities po of observing and pr of remembering are low but346
sufficient to stabilize the cooperator-discriminator equilibrium, increasing them further347
can allow defectors to invade and coexist with cooperators and discriminators at a stable348
interior equilibrium (as seen in the transition from Figure 2C to Figure 2D and in Figure349
3A and C). From there, a stable cooperator-discriminator equilibrium can be recovered350
by increasing po further until the stable interior equilibrium disappears, as seen in Figure351
2A and Figure 3A. As the interior equilibrium appears, the probability of any type of352
agent receiving a donation decreases because of the presence of defectors (Figure 3B and353
D). In other words, making more observations can sometimes undermine cooperation.354
At first sight unexpected, we can explain this finding as follows.355
Whether defectors can invade the cooperator-discriminator equilibrium is affected by356
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Figure 3: Increasing the probabilities po of observing or pr of remembering can allow
defectors to invade and decrease the probability of cooperation. In (A) and (C), we show
the frequencies of all three types of agents, first at the stable cooperator-discriminator
equilibrium and then at the stable interior equilibrium that the former turns into, as
functions of the probabilities po and pr, respectively. This is equivalent to taking a
horizontal and a vertical path, respectively, through Figure 2A. In (B) and (D), we show
the probability of each type of agent receiving a donation across games played with
random partners, first at the stable cooperator-discriminator equilibrium and then at the
stable interior equilibrium that the former turns into, as functions of the probabilities po
and pr, respectively. In each panel, the blue curve refers to cooperators, the red curve to
defectors, and the green curve to discriminators. If no lines are shown for a particular
value of po or pr, no stable cooperative equilibrium exists for that value. Parameters:
pr = 1 (unless varied), po = 0.3 (unless varied), aint = ainf = 0.93, R = 10, b = 10, c = 1,
pc = 0.5, and s = 0.
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the balance between the advantage to cooperators from being known by discriminators357
and the advantage to defectors from a high frequency of cooperators. As either po or358
pr increase, more cooperators can invade a group starting from the pure discriminator359
equilibrium, since they benefit from being known to discriminators and since they re-360
ceive higher payoffs than discriminators, who sometimes defect (Figure 3A and C). Once361
the fraction of discriminators at the cooperator-discriminator equilibrium is low enough,362
defectors can invade and exploit the cooperators (Figure 3A and C). As the probabil-363
ity of observing is increased further, the information acquired by discriminators allows364
them to cooperate selectively with cooperators while defecting against defectors. The365
frequency of defectors then decreases until they are eliminated altogether, resulting in a366
stable mixture of cooperators and discriminators (Figure 3A).367
These considerations also explain why cooperation can be stabilized by information368
assortment (Figure 1A). Increasing information assortment decreases the information369
discriminators have about the other types. Again, this reduces the frequency of coopera-370
tors, which are readily exploited by defectors, and thus ultimately reduces the frequency371
of defectors. The robustness of these results to changing the values of the probability pc372
of cooperating and to the benefit b of receiving a donation are discussed below, in the373
section entitled Robustness.374
Costly information can jeopardize cooperation375
Without a cost for information gathering or storage (cost of information, for short), suffi-376
cient assortment and sufficient observation can stabilize the cooperator-discriminator377
equilibrium. Making information costly can destabilize this equilibrium (Figure 4),378
which can be understood as follows.379
When the cost of information is increased, there are more cooperators at the cooperator-380
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discriminator equilibrium, because the discriminators are disadvantaged by paying a381
higher cost of information. This allows defectors to invade and coexist with cooperators382
and discriminators at a stable interior equilibrium (as seen in the transition from Figure383
4B to Figure 4C). As the cost of information is increased further, the discriminators even-384
tually do so poorly as to be unable to prevent defectors from dominating the group (as385
seen in the transition from Figure 4C to Figures 4D).386
As we have seen above, in the absence of costs, increasing the probabilities po of387
observing or pr of remembering can make it easier for defectors to invade. This shifts388
the group composition from a stable equilibrium with only cooperators and discrim-389
inators to a stable interior equilibrium at which defectors are also present. A stable390
cooperator-discriminator equilibrium can then be recovered by increasing po further.391
When information is sufficiently costly, increasing the probability of observing can no392
longer stabilize the cooperator-discriminator equilibrium and only serves to destabilize393
the stable interior equilibrium, causing defectors to dominate the group (as seen in the394
transition from Figure 4C to Figure 4D). Details about these bifurcations are provided in395
the Supporting Information, Section S5.396
Robustness397
For the analyses above, the probability pc that a discriminator donates to an unknown398
agent is set to 0.5. Our results are robust to changing this value. To see this, we recall399
that there are three types of stable equilibria at which cooperators are present: a sta-400
ble cooperator-defector equilibrium, a stable cooperator-discriminator equilibrium, and401
a stable interior equilibrium. Since discriminators are not present at a stable cooperator-402
defector equilibrium and pc only affects how discriminators behave toward unknown403
agents, pc does not affect the existence or stability of such an equilibrium (Support-404
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Figure 4: Costly information can destabilize cooperation. Moreover, when information
is costly, increasing the probability of observing can also destabilize otherwise stable
cooperation. In the upper panel (A), we show how the replicator dynamics depend on
the probability po of observation and the cost s of information. The horizontal axis is
scaled logarithmically and extends until po = ainf, beyond which po is not meaningful
(see Supporting Information, Section S1). The parameter space is colored according to
the most cooperative outcome of the replicator dynamics that occurs for a given combi-
nation of these parameters. A group made up entirely of defectors is always at a stable
equilibrium. In the red region, it is the only stable equilibrium. In the dark-blue region,
there is a stable cooperator-discriminator equilibrium. Caption continued below.
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Figure 4: In the light-blue region, there is a stable equilibrium at which all three types
are present. In the phase portraits (B)-(D), trajectories show how the frequencies of
cooperators, defectors, and discriminators change over time. The lower left corner of
the simplex represents a group made up entirely of cooperators, the lower right corner
a group made up entirely of defectors, and the upper corner a group made up entirely
of discriminators. The colors in the simplices indicate the basins of attraction of the
stable equilibria. Unstable equilibria are indicated with white circles, stable equilibria
with black circles, and saddles with half white and half black circles. Parameters: in
B, s = 0.005 ; in C, s = 0.035; in D, s = 0.065; in all panels, po = 0.8, pr = 0.9,
aint = ainf = 1.01, R = 10, b = 10, c = 1, and pc = 0.5.
ing Information, Figures S4-S7). If a stable cooperator-discriminator equilibrium exists405
when pc = 0.5, it will exist also for all values pc < 1, assuming that s = 0 (as seen in the406
Supporting Information, Section S4 and Figures S4-7). In other words, parameter combi-407
nations aint, ainf, po, and pr that give rise to a stable cooperator-discriminator for pc = 0.5408
do the same for all values of pc < 1, so the boundaries of the dark-blue regions in Fig-409
ures 1 and 2 do not change as pc is varied. If a stable interior equilibrium exists when410
pc = 0.5, it will exist also for all values 0.5 < pc < 1 (as seen in the Supporting Informa-411
tion, Figures S4 and S6), as well as for values of pc as low as 0.1, depending on the other412
parameters (as seen in the Supporting Information, Figures S5 and S7). In other words,413
parameter combinations aint, ainf, po, and pr that give rise to a stable interior equilibrium414
for pc = 0.5 do the same for a wide range of values of pc. For pc = 1, the edge of the415
simplex containing mixtures of cooperators and discriminators becomes a line of equi-416
libria that are neutral along that line. If there is either a stable cooperator-discriminator417
equilibrium or a stable interior equilibrium for pc just less than 1, any trajectory that418
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starts with sufficiently many discriminators will move toward this edge (as seen in the419
Supporting Information, Figures S4 and S6), so it can still be said that discriminators420
can keep defectors at bay (more details are provided in the Supplementary Information,421
Section S4). If a neutral interior equilibrium exists for pc = 0.5, changing pc can either422
stabilize or destabilize this equilibrium, depending on whether pc increases or decreases423
and on whether aint is greater than or less than 1 (as seen in the Supporting Information,424
Section S4 and Figures S4 and S5).425
For the analyses above, the benefit b from receiving a donation is set to 10. We show in426
the Supporting Information, Figure S8, that our findings about the effects of both interac-427
tion assortment and information assortment remain qualitatively unchanged at smaller428
values of b. We also show in the Supporting Information, Figure S8, that our findings429
that only moderate amounts of information are required to stabilize cooperation and430
that increasing information too much can jeopardize cooperation remain qualitatively431
unchanged at smaller values of b. One change brought about by reducing b is that too432
much information can be even more disastrous for cooperation: now increasing either433
pr or po can turn a stable interior equilibrium into a neutral center. This is indicated by434
the white regions in the Supporting Information, Figure S8B,D.435
Discussion436
We set out to answer the question of whether discriminators with limited information437
can promote and maintain cooperation and, if so, under what conditions. These ques-438
tions have previously been addressed, but earlier models often made unrealistic as-439
sumptions about the discriminators’ abilities and behaviors. Here we have introduced440
and analyzed a model that is more realistic in that there is assortment in the group’s441
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interactions, there is assortment in how discriminators observe the rest of the group,442
discriminators have limited amounts of information, and discriminators must pay costs443
for gathering or storing information. On this basis, we find that when interactions are444
negatively assorted or observations are positively assorted, discriminators can eliminate445
defectors from the group. We also find that even with limited information discrimina-446
tors can prevent the invasion of defectors and that increasing the information they have447
about their peers can impede their ability to do so. Finally, we find that when informa-448
tion gathering or storing is costlier, discriminators are less able to stabilize cooperation.449
If only cooperators and defectors are present, sufficient positive interaction assort-450
ment can allow a group to reach a stable mix of both types. This finding is in agreement451
with previous work showing that interaction assortment can stabilize cooperation when452
cooperators are more likely to interact with other cooperators than with defectors (Ax-453
elrod & Hamilton, 1981; Pepper & Smuts, 2002; Panchanathan & Boyd, 2004; Doebeli &454
Hauert, 2005; Fletcher & Doebeli, 2006; Nowak, 2006; Ackermann et al., 2008; Rankin455
& Taborsky, 2009; Ghang & Nowak, 2015; Roberts, 2015). Through the presence of dis-456
criminators, who use indirect reciprocity to decide how to behave, a group can reach457
an equilibrium at which both cooperators and discriminators, and sometimes only co-458
operators and discriminators, are present. This finding agrees with previous models in459
which the presence of discriminators using indirect reciprocity to decide when to coop-460
erate helped support cooperation (Nowak & Sigmund, 1998a,b; Panchanathan & Boyd,461
2004; Brandt & Sigmund, 2006; Ohtsuki & Iwasa, 2006; Uchida & Sigmund, 2010; Naka-462
mura & Masuda, 2011). In particular, our model reverts to that of Nowak & Sigmund463
(1998b) and recovers their results when we consider discriminators with no assortment,464
full information about their peers, and cost-free gathering and storing of information.465
When all three types of agents are present, negative interaction assortment allows a466
25
mix of cooperators and discriminators to become stable against invasion by defectors.467
This is in stark contrast to most previous studies of negative interaction assortment. For468
example, negative assortment has been found to impede the evolution of cooperation469
(Fletcher & Doebeli, 2006) and to support the evolution of spite, an action that hurts470
both the actor and the recipient (West & Gardner, 2010; Smead & Forber, 2013; Forber471
& Smead, 2014). Negative assortment can also lead to a higher rate of conflict (Choi &472
Bowles, 2007). These undesirable consequences of negative interaction assortment occur473
in groups that consist only of a cooperating type and a defecting type. In that case, under474
negative interaction assortment, an agent of the defecting type receives a higher payoff475
from more frequently interacting with cooperators, raising the rate at which defection476
increases in frequency. In contrast, when discriminators are also present and all three477
types interact with negative assortment, discriminators benefit from interacting more478
frequently with cooperators and can thus increase in frequency to such an extent that479
they are able to deny benefits to defectors. Our finding therefore broadens the set of cir-480
cumstances that promote cooperation to include negative as well as positive interaction481
assortment.482
Information assortment is a fundamentally new form of assortment, which we find483
to be beneficial for cooperation. Despite the large literature on the effects of interaction484
assortment on the evolution of cooperation, no other studies, to our knowledge, have485
considered the effects of information assortment. By examining how assortment might486
affect observations as well as interactions, we find a new way in which group structure487
can promote cooperation.488
Assortment can arise through several mechanisms. If agents can recognize others of489
the same type, they could preferentially interact with or cooperate with them. This so-490
called “green-beard” mechanism is known to give rise to positive assortment (Gardner491
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& West, 2010; Nonacs, 2011) and to support cooperation (Nowak, 2006; Sinervo et al.,492
2006; Smukalla et al., 2008; Rankin & Taborsky, 2009; Gardner & West, 2010). If agents493
recognize others of the same type and decide to avoid them, this will give rise to nega-494
tive assortment. However, such a cognitive mechanism is not required for assortment to495
occur. If cooperative behavior has a genetic component and agents often interact with496
kin, a group will be positively assorted (Panchanathan & Boyd, 2004; Fletcher & Doebeli,497
2006; Nowak, 2006). If, instead, offspring disperse away from their parents, a group498
may become negatively assorted. In models with only cooperators and defectors, both499
positive and negative assortment resulted when agents moved away from parts of the500
environment where defectors had depleted resources (Pepper & Smuts, 2002). Extrap-501
olating these findings, we could expect to find both positive and negative assortment502
among all three types under similar circumstances. Finally, when animals inherit the503
social connections of their parents, the resulting social network is positively assorted,504
such that animals are more likely to be connected to others with traits similar to their505
own (Ilany & Akcay, 2016). Conversely, if they set out on their own to forge different506
relationships from their parents’, we would expect the resulting social network to be507
negatively assorted.508
In previous models, assortment only affected the rates at which different types of509
agents interact. In our model, it also affects the rates at which different types of agents510
are observed. It is likely that the two levels of assortment are equal in many situations.511
However, disentangling the two types of assortment allows us to study their respective512
effects. Additionally, if the two behaviors, interacting and observing, occur on different513
spatial and temporal scales, we expect the resulting assortments to be different. For514
instance, if agents can observe interactions occurring far away but only interact with515
others that are close to them, interaction assortment will exceed information assortment.516
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Conversely, if cooperation can occur through acoustic or other long-range mechanisms517
and agents are in an environment where it is hard to see very far (e.g., birds in a dense518
forest or bats in a dark cave), information assortment will exceed interaction assortment.519
Even if we assume that the two assortment factors are equal (as we do in Figures 2-4),520
we still find that varying assortment can result in the full range of possibilities from no521
stable cooperation, to a stable interior equilibrium, to a stable cooperative equilibrium522
(moving along the diagonal in Figure 1).523
In many realistic settings, there will be a complex interplay between density depen-524
dence, interaction assortment, and information assortment. For example, positive assort-525
ment among discriminators might mean that they are more densely packed and hence526
experience density-dependent birth and death rates differing from the other types of527
agents. We make the simplifying assumption that density dependence affects all agents528
equally. If assortment were to give rise to differential density dependence, we would529
expect that this would favor cooperators over defectors, assuming that cooperators im-530
prove the suitability of their environments while defectors deplete their surroundings.531
Thus, incorporating these effects into our model would tend to expand parameter com-532
binations for which we find stable cooperation.533
While limited information could be an obstacle to the emergence and maintenance534
of cooperation, we encouragingly find that, to promote cooperation, discriminators do535
not need to know about every agent in a group. In fact, even when the probabilities536
of observing other agents and of remembering those observations are low, a group can537
equilibrate with cooperators present. This result is encouraging for the stabilization538
of cooperation, since discriminators with more moderate information requirements pay539
less for their information gathering and storage and therefore are more likely to evolve.540
Cooperative groups less burdened by the costs of information can become more pros-541
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perous. Our results reinforce previous studies that find that discriminators with limited542
information can support cooperation (Nowak & Sigmund, 1998a,b; Brandt & Sigmund,543
2006; Nakamura & Masuda, 2011). In particular, Nowak & Sigmund (1998b) analyzed544
limited information by assuming that, for any given discriminator, there is a fixed prob-545
ability that he will know the reputation of any other agent. They further assumed that546
discriminators always donate to agents whose reputations they do not know (equivalent547
to setting our parameter pc = 1) and found that discriminators can stabilize cooperation548
if the probability of knowing about other agents exceeds a threshold. This is analogous549
to our finding that the probabilities of observing and remembering have to be sufficiently550
high for cooperation to be stabilized. In psychology and economics, it is increasingly rec-551
ognized that humans have cognitive limitations that affect the level of optimality with552
which we can make decisions, as described by the theory of bounded rationality (Con-553
lisk, 1996; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Kahneman, 2003). Similarly, humans often554
choose to ignore some of the information available to them, a phenomenon known as555
rational inattention, which can affect, e.g., how consumers make decisions in economic556
models (Sims, 2003, 2006; Matejka & Sims, 2011; Caplin & Dean, 2015). It is therefore557
natural to consider agents with limited information and it is important to understand558
how this affects their behavior.559
Surprisingly, increasing the ability of discriminators to observe their peers can help560
defectors, rather than cooperators. If discriminators do not yet observe other agents very561
frequently and start to increase their probability of making an observation, it becomes562
easier for defectors to invade the cooperative equilibrium. Increasing information only563
helps defectors invade when discriminators do not necessarily cooperate with strangers,564
as we show in the Supporting Information, Figure S6. This explains why previous stud-565
ies of the effect of limited information on indirect reciprocity, such as Nowak & Sigmund566
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(1998b), did not identify any negative effects of increased information. Studying a related567
model, Uchida (2010) also found that reducing the information players have about each568
other can make it easier for discriminators (“SCORING” agents in their terminology)569
to stabilize cooperation. In a similar spirit, Kreps et al. (1982) found that uncertainty570
about a partner’s rationality can help prevent defection. These effects can only be seen571
in models, like ours, that account for limited information.572
Since the frequency of discriminators in the cooperator-discriminator equilibrium in-573
creases as the discriminators have less information, if the discriminators’ abilities were574
evolving, either the probability of observing or that of remembering might decrease575
over time until they become too small to protect cooperators. This prediction is contin-576
gent, however, upon the assumption that discriminators only use a first-order assessment577
strategy, which does not depend on the reputation of the recipient. More sophisticated578
assessment rules and selection on the discriminators’ processes of information gathering579
and storage are left for future work, as discussed below.580
We have shown that imposing costs on the discriminators for gathering and stor-581
ing information can jeopardize their limited ability to protect cooperation, which agrees582
with previous findings that information costs make it harder for indirect reciprocity to583
stabilize cooperation (Suzuki & Kimura, 2013). In our model, making information more584
costly can destabilize otherwise stable cooperative equilibria. There is also a counter-585
intuitive interaction between costs and the probability of observing: when information586
is more costly, increasing the probability of observing can destabilize cooperation and587
enable defectors to dominate a group. It indeed seems likely that spending time and588
energy observing other agents and remembering those observations imposes some costs589
on discriminators (Nelson, 1970; Waddington, 1985; Laughlin et al., 1998; Laughlin, 2001;590
MacIver et al., 2010; Caplin & Dean, 2015), adding saliency to our corresponding find-591
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ings.592
In our model, discriminators use simple methods for assigning reputations to their593
peers. In particular, their opinions depend only on the last observation they can remem-594
ber; they can categorize other agents only coarsely; and the way a donor’s reputation595
is updated does not depend on either his or the recipient’s reputations. As avenues for596
future research, it would be interesting to relax each of these three assumptions. In par-597
ticular, other ways of assessing an agent’s reputation can incorporate information about598
the reputations of both the focal agent and his interaction partner. For example, there are599
eight such assessment rules, the “leading eight,” such that (1) if discriminators use these600
rules, a pure discriminator group is at a stable equilibrium, and (2) using these rules601
results in a high payoff for members of such a group (Ohtsuki & Iwasa, 2004, 2006). The602
mechanisms we consider here—interaction assortment, information assortment, and in-603
formation gathering and storing—could be applied to groups with discriminators using604
these more complicated rules. An agent’s payoff in an assorted group using a more605
complicated assessment rule can no longer be derived analytically and will instead have606
to be computed numerically. Despite the complication of such a model, it would enable607
an interesting extension of our analyses. Since interaction assortment has been found to608
be important in many models, we expect that the benefits of information assortment will609
also generalize to other types of discriminators.610
Moreover, the probabilities of observing and remembering, characterizing the dis-611
criminators’ processes of information gathering and storing, are fixed in our model. In612
future work, it will be interesting to regard these characteristics as evolving traits that613
can differ among discriminators. The evolution of these traits can then be studied using614
adaptive-dynamics techniques. Related to this outlook, Kerr & Feldman (2003) analyzed615
a model in which agents gathered and stored information about their environment: they616
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observed evolutionary branching through which a group could endogenously evolve two617
coexisting information-gathering strategies. It will be worthwhile exploring whether a618
similar kind of evolutionary branching can bring about a polymorphism of discrimina-619
tors, in which, for example, some agents observe a lot, but have poor memory, while620
others make few observations, but remember those very well.621
Our current work provides encouraging results about how cooperation can be main-622
tained on the timescale of frequency changes among fixed types of agents, even by623
simple discriminators with limited information. The next big challenge is to understand624
the conditions under which discriminator-facilitated cooperation based on indirect reci-625
procity can be maintained when the behaviors of discriminators can evolve.626
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Supporting information734
S1 Attainable probabilities of observing735
Here we explain in greater detail why the probability po of observing is restricted not to736
exceed min{ainf, 1/ainf}.737
The intuitive explanation is as follows. If a discriminator focuses his observations738
on other discriminators (i.e., if there is positive information assortment, ainf > 1), this739
means that when a group contains only a few discriminators, the discriminator can740
observe only a limited proportion of such a group. Similarly, if a discriminator focuses741
his observations on other types of agents (i.e., if there is negative information assortment,742
ainf < 1), this means that when a group contains only a few cooperators and defectors,743
the discriminator can observe only a limited proportion of such a group. Only when744
the discriminators’ observations are not assorted (ainf = 1) does it become possible for a745
discriminator to observe the whole group (po = 1).746
The mathematical explanation is as follows. Achieving the desired information as-747
sortment requires choosing a fraction po of the group in which the number of cooperators748
are proportional to x1, of defectors to x2, and of discriminators to ainfx3. Writing C for749
the positive proportionality constant, this is feasible if and only if750
Cx1 ≤ x1,751
Cx2 ≤ x2, and752
Cainfx3 ≤ x3.753
754
Hence, C ≤ min{1, 1/ainf}. Since a discriminator observes a fraction po of the group, we755
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must have po = Cx1 + Cx2 + Cainfx3. Thus,756
po ≤ x1 + x2 + ainfx3 and757
po ≤ x1/ainf + x2/ainf + x3.758
759
These inequalities are fulfilled for all frequencies 0 ≤ x1, x2, x3 ≤ 1 if and only if po ≤760
min{ainf, 1/ainf}, as stated in the main text.761
S2 How reputation knowledge depends on observing and remember-762
ing763
Here we derive expressions for the probabilities that a discriminator has an opinion764
about another agent and that a discriminator has a good opinion about another dis-765
criminator. We also prove two relations involving these probabilities that are useful for766
analyzing the replicator dynamics of our model.767
We use ki(t) to denote the probability that a discriminator has an opinion about an768
agent of type i at time t. The sum of these probabilities over all rounds, Ki = ∑Rt=1 ki(t),769
depends on the information parameters po and pr, the degree of information assortment770
ainf, and the number R of rounds. We use g(t) to denote the probability that a discrimi-771
nator has a good opinion about another discriminator at time t. The sum of these prob-772
abilities over all rounds, G = ∑Rt=1 g(t), depends on the information parameters po and773
pr, the degree of information assortment ainf, and the number R of rounds, but also on774
the observed behaviors of the discriminators, and hence on the degree of interaction as-775
sortment aint and on the frequencies of the three types of agents, x1, x2, and x3. We some-776
times write gx1,x3(t) and Gx1,x3 to emphasize the latter dependence (bearing in mind that777
x2 = 1− x1 − x3). In the following, we write xij for the frequency with which an agent778
of type i interacts with an agent of type j. For example, x33 = aintx3/(x1 + x2 + aintx3).779
39
We denote by po,i the probability of a focal agent be observed by a discriminator, given780
he is of type i. For example, po,3 = x33/x3 = poainf/(x1 + x2 + ainfx3).781
A discriminator has an opinion about another agent at time t if he has observed the782
other agent at time t− 1 and remembers that observation or if he did not observe the783
other agent but had an opinion about him at time t − 1 and remembers that opinion.784
This establishes a recursive equation for how ki(t) depends on ki(t− 1),785
ki(t) = prpo,i + ki(t− 1)pr(1− po,i).786
We can then show inductively that if ki(1) = 0, ki(t) for t > 1 is given by787
ki(t) = prpo,i
1− pt−1r (1− po,i)t−1








1− pr(1− po,i) −
prpo,i(1− pRr (1− po,i)R)
(1− pr(1− po,i))2 .790
Analogously, a discriminator has a good opinion about another discriminator at time791
t if he has observed the discriminator donating at time t− 1 and remembers that obser-792
vation, or if he did not observe the other discriminator but had a good opinion about793
him at time t− 1 and remembers that opinion. A discriminator donates to cooperators794
of whom he has an opinion, to discriminators of whom he has a good opinion, and with795
probability pc to agents he does not know about. This establishes a recursive equation796
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for how g(t) depends on ki(t− 1) and g(t− 1),797
gx1,x3(t) = prpo,3
(









+ pr(1− po,3)gx1,x3(t− 1)799





+ pr(po,3x33 + 1− po,3)gx1,x3(t− 1)801
= prpo,3pc + prpo,3k1(t− 1)x31 − prpo,3pc ((1− x33)k1(t− 1) + x33k3(t− 1))802
+ pr(po,3x33 + 1− po,3)gx1,x3(t− 1) since po,1 = po,2 and therefore k1 = k2.803
804
Since this recursive equation does not yield a convenient closed-form expression for805
Gx1,x3 , we determine Gx1,x3 numerically.806
Our model reverts to that of Nowak & Sigmund (1998b) when there is no assortment807
and discriminators have perfect information (ainf = aint = po = pr = 1). (Nowak &808
Sigmund also considered a case with limited information, but rather than keeping track809
of observations and memories at each point in time, they assumed that discriminators810
have a fixed probability of knowing about their peers, so their analysis of a model with811
limited information is not directly comparable to our model when po, pr < 1.) Nowak812
& Sigmund (1998b) derived equations for their equivalent of G. Here we extend some813
of their results to allow for assortment and the mechanism for information gathering814
described in the main text. The lemmas stated below allow us to simplify the payoff815
functions for the three types of agents, given in Section S3, and recover statements made816
by Nowak & Sigmund (1998b) for ainf = aint = po = pr = 1.817
Lemma S.1 G0,1 = pcK3.818
Proof. It suffices to show that g0,1(t) = pck3(t) for every t. We prove this by induction819
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on t. First we consider t = 1, 2,820
g0,1(1) = 0 = pck3(1) and821
g0,1(2) = prpopc = pck3(2).822
823
Thus, the claim is true for t = 1, 2. Now we assume the claim is true up to t− 1,824
g0,1(t) = prpo,3pc − prpo,3pck3(t− 1) + pr(po,3 + 1− po,3)g0,1(t− 1)825
= prpo,3pc − prpo,3pck3(t− 1) + prpck3(t− 1) by the inductive hypothesis826
= pc
(





Thus, the claim is proved.830
Lemma S.2
Gx1,x3 − G0,x3 =
x31
pc(1− x33) (pcK3 − G0,x3).
Proof. It suffices to show that gx1,x3(t)− g0,x3(t) = x31pc(1−x33)(pck3(t)− g0,x3(t)) for every831
t. We prove this by induction on t. First we consider t = 1, 2,832
gx1,x3(1) = g0,x3(1) = k3(1) = 0833
⇒ gx1,x3(1)− g0,x3(1) = 0 =
x31
pc(1− x33) (pck3(1)− g0,x3(1)),834
and gx1,x3(2) = g0,x3(2) = prpo,3pc, k3(2) = prpo,3,835
⇒ gx1,x3(2)− g0,x3(2) = 0 =
x31
pc(1− x33) (pck3(2)− g0,x3(2)).836837
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Thus, the claim is true for t = 1, 2. Now we assume the claim is true up to t− 1,838
gx1,x3(t) = prpo,3pc + prpo,3k1(t− 1)x31 − prpo,3pc ((1− x33)k1(t− 1) + x33k3(t− 1))839
+ pr (po,3x33 + 1− po,3) gx1,x3(t− 1)840
= prpo,3pc + prpo,3k1(t− 1)x31 − prpo,3pc ((1− x33)k1(t− 1) + x33k3(t− 1))841




pc(1− x33) (pck3(t− 1)− g0,x3(t− 1))
)
842
by the inductive hypothesis843
= prpo,3pc − prpo,3pc ((1− x33)k1(t− 1) + x33k3(t− 1)) + pr (po,3x33 + 1− po,3) g0,x3(t− 1)844
+
x31
pc(1− x33) (prpo,3pc(1− x33)k1(t− 1) + pr (po,3x33 + 1− po,3) pck3(t− 1)845
− pr (po,3x33 + 1− po,3) g0,x3(t− 1))846
= g0,x3(t) +
x31
pc(1− x33) (pcprpo,3 + pcpr(1− po,3)k3(t− 1)+847
− pcprpo,3 + prpo,3pc((1− x33)k1(t− 1) + x33k3(t− 1))848
− pr (po,3x33 + 1− po,3) g0,x3(t− 1))849
= g0,x3(t) +
x31
pc(1− x33) (pck3(t)− g0,x3(t)) .850851
Thus, the claim is proved.852
S3 Derivation of payoffs853
Here we derive expressions for the expected payoffs Pˆi of agents of type i, as well as a854
condition that must be satisfied at equilibrium.855
For each of the three types, an agent’s expected payoff depends on his own behavior,856
the behaviors of the other types, and the frequencies of all three types. The payoffs also857
depend on how assorted the discriminators are in their interactions. In the following, we858
write xij for the frequency with which an agent of type i interacts with an agent of type859
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j. For example, x33 = aintx3/(x1 + x2 + aintx3). As explained in Section S2, Ki describes860
how likely a discriminator is to know about an agent of type i and G describes how861
likely a discriminator is to consider another discriminator as good.862
For cooperators,863
Pˆ1 = bRx11 + bpc(R− K1)x13 + bK1x13 − cR,864
since a cooperator receives a donation from any other cooperator, with probability pc865
from any discriminator who does not have an opinion about him, and from any dis-866
criminator who has an opinion about him, and since a cooperator always donates. For867
defectors,868
Pˆ2 = bRx21 + bpc(R− K2)x23,869
since a defector receives a donation from any cooperator and with probability pc from870
any discriminator who does not have an opinion about him, and since a defector never871
donates. For discriminators,872








pc − cK1x31 − cGx33 − s,873
since a discriminator receives a donation from any cooperator, with probability pc from874
any discriminator who does not have an opinion about him, and from any discriminator875
who has a good opinion about him, since a discriminator donates with probability pc to876
any unknown agent, to any cooperator he has an opinion about, and to any discriminator877
he has a good opinion about, and since discriminators pay a cost for their information878
gathering and storage. We can subtract the same quantity from all payoff functions879
without affecting the resulting replicator dynamics (Nowak & Sigmund, 1998b), so for880
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simplicity we subtract Pˆ2 from each expected payoff, giving881
P1 = Pˆ1 − Pˆ2,882
P2 = 0,883
P3 = Pˆ3 − Pˆ2.884
885
According to the replicator dynamics, a group reaches an equilibrium when either886
xi = 0 or Pi = P¯ for each i. Here we derive expressions for P1 and P3 when aint = 1. It is887
always the case that K1 = K2. When aint = 1, x1i = x2i = x3i = xi for i = 1, 2, 3. In this888
case,889
P1 = bK1x3 − cR,890
P2 = 0,891
P3 = bpcx3(K1 − K3) + (b− c)Gx1,x3x3 − c(R− (1− x3)K1 − x3K3)pc − cK1x1 − s892
= (b− c)Gx1,x3x3 − c(R− K1)pc − cx3(K1 − K3)pc − cK1x1 − s.893
894
In Section S2, we proved (Lemma S.2) that895
Gx1,x3 − G0,x3 =
x1
pc(1− x3) (pcK− G0,x3).896
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If aint = 1, we can use this to rewrite P3 − P¯,897
P3 − P¯ = (1− x3)P3 − x1P1898
= (1− x3)bpcx3(K1 − K3) + (1− x3)x3(b− c)Gx1,x3 − (1− x3)c(R− K1)pc899
− (1− x3)x3c(K1 − K3)pc − x1(1− x3)cK1 − s(1− x3)− x1x3bK1 + x1cR900




pc(1− x3) (pcK3 − G0,x3)
)
901
− pc(1− x3)c(R− K1) + x1c(R− K1)− x1x3(b− c)K1 − pc(1− x3)x3c(K1 − K3)− s(1− x3)902
= x3(b− c) pc(1− x3)− x1pc G0,x3 + x1x3(b− c)K3 − pc(1− x3)c(R− K1) + x1c(R− K1)903












(b− c)x3(G0,x3 + pc(K1 − K3))− cpc(R− K1)
)
− s(1− x3).906907
If s = 0, any equilibrium with discriminators at non-zero frequency must satisfy either908
pc(1− x3)− x1 = 0 or909
(b− c)x3(G0,x3 + pc(K1 − K3))− cpc(R− K1) = 0.910
If s > 0, any equilibrium with discriminators at non-zero frequency must satisfy911
(b− c)x3(G0,x3 + pc(K1 − K3)) = c(R− K1)pc +
spc(1− x3)
pc(1− x3)− x1 .912
These conditions describe lines and curves in the simplex whose intersections with the913
simplex borders or with a line on which P1 = P2 determine the locations of the replicator914
dynamics’ equilibria.915
S4 Changing the probability of donating to an unknown agent916
For most of our analyses in the main text, the probability pc that a discriminator donates917
to an unknown agent is set to 0.5. Here we investigate the robustness of our results to918
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other choices of pc.919
Our main results are that, when discriminators have sufficient information about920
their peers and when interactions are negatively assorted or observations are positively921
assorted, a stable cooperator-discriminator equilibrium can be reached. Additionally,922
increasing the amount of information available to discriminators can allow defectors to923
invade such a stable cooperator-discriminator equilibrium. Assuming s = 0, if the in-924
teraction assortment aint, information assortment ainf, probability po of observing, and925
probability pr of remembering allow for a stable mixture of cooperators and discrimina-926
tors for pc = 0.5, this equilibrium will exist and will be stable for all values of pc < 1.927
This means that the boundaries of the dark blue regions in Figures 1 and 2 are the same928
for any value of pc < 1. This can be seen in Figures S4-S7. Similarly, if a stable interior929
equilibrium exists for pc = 0.5, it will exist for all values of 0.5 < pc < 1 (Figures S4 and930
S6) and for values of pc that can be as low as 0.1 (Figures S5 and S7).931
The extreme case when pc = 1 does change the dynamics slightly. For pc = 1,932
discriminators always donate to unknown agents. In the absence of defectors, a dis-933
criminator will always cooperate, so the edge of the simplex between discriminators934
and cooperators becomes neutral. In other words, every point on the edge becomes an935
equilibrium (as can be seen by the line of points along the left edge of the simplexes936
in the right-most columns of Figures S4 and S6). However, the directions of trajecto-937
ries to or from the interior of the simplex are unchanged. If there was either a stable938
cooperator-discriminator equilibrium or a stable interior equilibrium for pc just below939
1, for pc = 1, trajectories that start at the top of the simplex will move toward the940
cooperator-discriminator edge, while trajectories that start at the bottom of the simplex941
will move toward the pure defector equilibrium (Figures S4 and S6). While there is no942
longer a unique stable cooperative equilibrium, it can still be said that discriminators943
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can keep defectors at bay. Similarly, in the extreme case when pc = 0, the edge of the944
simplex between discriminators and defectors becomes neutral. Again, the directions of945
trajectories to or from this edge remain unchanged.946
The replicator dynamics can be changed by varying pc. If there is a stable interior947
equilibrium when pc = 0.5, this can be destabilized when pc is low enough (Figures S5948
and S7). In this case, discriminators cooperate so rarely with strangers that their help949
is no longer sufficient to maintain cooperators in the group. This means that parts of950
the light-blue regions in Figures 1 and 2 can turn red when pc increases. Additionally,951
the neutral centers indicated by the white regions in Figures 1 and 2 are affected by pc.952
When aint < 1, the center is stabilized as soon as pc > 0.5 and destabilized as soon as953
pc < 0.5 (Figures S4 and S5). Conversely, when aint > 1, the center is destabilized as954
soon as pc > 0.5 and stabilized as soon as pc < 0.5 (Figures S4 and S5). This means that955
parts of the white region in Figure 1 can turn either light-blue or red.956
We can, in fact, show mathematically that if a cooperator-discriminator equilibrium957
exists for pc = 0.5, it will exist for all values pc < 1. For this, we consider the expected958
payoffs in a group consisting only of defectors and discriminators, i.e., at a point given959
by the frequency combination p2 = (0, 1− x3, x3), when the cost of information is zero,960
s = 0,961
Pˆ2 = bpc(R− K2)x23,962
Pˆ3 = bpc(R− K3)x33 + (b− c)G0,x3x33 − cpc(R− K2x32 − K3x33).963
964
If this point is an equilibrium, Pˆ2 = Pˆ3, and thus965
bpc(R− K2)x23 = bpc(R− K3)x33 + (b− c)G0,x3x33 − cpc(R− K2x32 − K3x33). (S1)966
967
It is clear from the definition of G that G0,x3 is proportional to pc. This means that, in968
the absence of cooperators, the total payoffs to both defectors and discriminators are969
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proportional to pc. This makes sense, since discriminators cooperate with defectors only970
when the latter are unknown to them, an occurrence dictated by pc, and the probabil-971
ity of a discriminator being considered good by other discriminators is dictated by his972
initial random acts of cooperation, also dictated by pc. Consequently, if Pˆ2 = Pˆ3 for any973
particular value of pc, it follows that Pˆ2 = Pˆ3 for all values of pc. Therefore, if p2 is an974
equilibrium for any value of pc, it will be an equilibrium for all values of pc.975
Next, we consider the point given by the frequency combination p1 = (1− x3, 0, x3).976
We now show that, if p2 = (0, 1− x3, x3) is an equilibrium, p1 will also be an equilibrium.977
It is always true that K1 = K2. It is also true that x23 at p2 equals x13 at p1 and that x32 at978
p2 equals x31 at p1. Hence, if S1 holds at p2,979
bpc(R− K1)x13 = bpc(R− K3)x33 + (b− c)G0,x3x33 − cpc(R− K1x31 − K3x33) (S2)980
981
will hold at p1. Therefore,982
bpc(R− K1)x13 = bpcRx33 + (b− c)(G0,x3x33 − pcK3)x33 − cpc(R− K1x31)983
= bpcRx33 + (b− c)pc(G0,x3x33 − Gx1,x3)x33 − cpc(R− K1x31)984
using Lemma S.2985
⇒ b(R− K1)x13 = bRx33 + (b− c)(G0,x3x33 − Gx1,x3)x33 − c(R− K1x31)986
⇒ bR− bRx11 − bK1x13 = bR− bRx31 + (b− c)(G0,x3x33 − Gx1,x3)x33 − cR+ cK1x31987
⇒ bRx11 + bK1x13 − cR = bRx31 − cK1x31 + (b− c)(Gx1,x3x33 − G0,x3)x33. (S3)988
989
Combining Equations S2 and S3, we find that Pˆ1 = Pˆ3 at p1, so that p1 is also an equi-990




Here we identify and explain the various bifurcations occurring in the replicator dynam-994
ics of our model.995
We assess the stability of each equilibrium discussed here by numerically calculating996
the eigenvalues of the Jacobian of the replicator dynamics there. The transition from B to997
C in Figure 1 involves two transcritical bifurcations. First, an equilibrium to the left of the998
simplex moves to the interior, exchanging stability in the direction toward the interior999
of the simplex with the cooperator-discriminator equilibrium. Thus, the cooperator-1000
discriminator equilibrium changes from a stable node to a saddle and a stable interior1001
equilibrium appears. Simultaneously, an equilibrium to the right of the simplex moves1002
to the interior, exchanging stability in the direction toward the interior of the simplex1003
with the defector-discriminator equilibrium. Thus, the defector-discriminator equilib-1004
rium changes from an unstable node to a saddle and an unstable interior equilibrium1005
appears.1006
The transition from C to D in Figure 1 involves a saddle-node bifurcation, as the three1007
interior equilibria collide: the equilibria on the left and right annihilate each other and1008
the middle equilibria changes from a saddle to a neutral center.1009
The transition from D to E in Figure 1 involves two transcritical bifurcations. First,1010
an equilibrium to the left of the simplex moves to the interior, exchanging stability in1011
the direction toward the interior of the simplex with the cooperator-discriminator equi-1012
librium. Thus, the cooperator-discriminator equilibrium changes from a saddle to a1013
stable node and a saddle appears in the interior. Simultaneously, an equilibrium to1014
the right of the simplex moves to the interior, exchanging stability in the direction to-1015
ward the interior of the simplex with the defector-discriminator equilibrium. Thus, the1016
defector-discriminator equilibrium changes from a saddle to an unstable node and a1017
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saddle appears in the interior.1018
The transition from D to F in Figure 1 involves a saddle-node bifurcation that results1019
in the appearance of a stable node and an unstable node on the cooperator-defector edge.1020
The neutral center moves from the interior of the simplex to the exterior and becomes a1021
saddle.1022
The transition from B to C in Figure 2 involves a saddle-node bifurcation that results1023
in the appearance of a stable node and an unstable node on the left and right edges of1024
the simplex, respectively. Simultaneously, a saddle that was above the simplex on its1025
exterior moves to the interior.1026
The transition from C to D in Figure 2 involves two transcritical bifurcations. First,1027
an equilibrium to the left of the simplex moves to the interior, exchanging stability in1028
the direction toward the interior of the simplex with the cooperator-discriminator equi-1029
librium. Thus, the cooperator-discriminator equilibrium changes from a stable node to1030
a saddle and a stable interior equilibrium appears. Simultaneously, an equilibrium to1031
the right of the simplex moves to the interior, exchanging stability in the direction to-1032
ward the interior of the simplex with the defector-discriminator equilibrium. Thus, the1033
defector-discriminator equilibrium changes from an unstable node to a saddle and an1034
unstable interior equilibrium appears.1035
The transition from B to C in Figure 4 involves a transcritical bifurcation. An equilib-1036
rium to the left of the simplex moves to the interior, exchanging stability in the direction1037
toward the interior of the simplex with the cooperator-discriminator equilibrium. Thus,1038
the cooperator-discriminator equilibrium changes from a stable node to a saddle and a1039
stable interior equilibrium appears.1040
The transition from C to D in Figure 4 involves a saddle-node bifurcation. The stable1041
node and the saddle in the interior of the simplex collide and annihilate each other.1042
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S6 Additional Figures1043
Figure S1: No amount of information can stabilize cooperation if there is neither in-
formation assortment nor interaction assortment. In (A), we show how the replicator
dynamics depend on the probabilities po of observing and pr of remembering. The pa-
rameter space is colored according to the most cooperative outcome of the replicator
dynamics that occurs for a given combination of these parameters. Caption continued
below.
52
Figure S1: A group made up entirely of defectors is always at a stable equilibrium. In
the red region, it is the only stable equilibrium. In the white region, a neutral interior
equilibrium exists, but a group made up entirely of defectors is still the only stable equi-
librium. The horizontal axis extends until po = ainf, beyond which po is not meaningful
(see the Supporting Information, Section S1). In the phase portraits (B)-(C), trajecto-
ries show how the frequencies of cooperators, defectors, and discriminators change over
time. The lower left corner of the simplex represents a group made up entirely of co-
operators, the lower right corner a group made up entirely of defectors, and the upper
corner a group made up entirely of discriminators. The colors in the simplices indicate
the basins of attraction of the (possibly multiple) stable equilibria. Unstable equilib-
ria are indicated with white circles, neutral centers with gray circles, saddles with half
white and half black circles, and stable equilibria with black circles. In (B), all trajec-
tories that start within the simplex eventually move toward the equilibrium made up
entirely of discriminators. In (C), trajectories that start in the white region cycle around
the neutral center. Parameters: in B, pr = 0.05; in C, pr = 0.95; in all panels, po = 0.85,
aint = ainf = 1, R = 10, b = 10, c = 1, pc = 0.5, and s = 0.
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Figure S2: As the number R of rounds increases, less assortment is needed to stabilize
the cooperator-discriminator equilibrium, and in the limit of infinitely many rounds, any
assortment suffices to stabilize the equilibrium. The horizontal axis shows the number
R of rounds for which the game is played (on a logarithmic scale) and the vertical axis
shows the degree of information assortment ainf or interaction assortment aint required to
stabilize the cooperator-discriminator equilibrium, while the other assortment parameter
is fixed at 1. Parameters: pr = 0.95, po = 0.85, b = 10, c = 1, pc = 0.5, and s = 0.
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Figure S3: The more rounds R a group plays and the greater the benefit b of cooperation,
the less information is required to stabilize cooperation. Each line separates the param-
eter space of the probabilities po of observing and pr of remembering into two regions:
above the line, information suffices to stabilize either a cooperator-discriminator equilib-
rium or an interior equilibrium, whereas below the line, information is insufficient to do
so. (This transition also occurs at the boundary between the red and dark-blue regions
in Figure 2A.) Parameters: aint = ainf = 0.93, c = 1, pc = 0.5, and s = 0.
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Figure S4: Caption below.
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Figure S4: Increasing the probability pc of cooperating with unknown agents does not
change the existence or stability of cooperator-discriminator equilibria. In the left col-
umn, the phase portraits are as in Figure 1. The one difference is that, whereas in
Figure 1 we showed a neutral interior equilibrium for the single parameter combination
aint = ainf = 1, here we show two other parameter combinations that give rise to a neu-
tral interior equilibrium, the first with both assortment parameters less than 1 and the
second with both assortment parameters greater than 1. Moving from top to bottom,
from one panel to the next either one or both of the assortment parameters, aint and
ainf, increase. Moving from left to right, pc increases until it equals 1. In each phase
portrait, trajectories show how the frequencies of cooperators, defectors, and discrimi-
nators change over time. The lower left corner of the simplex represents a group made
up entirely of cooperators, the lower right corner a group made up entirely of defectors,
and the upper corner a group made up entirely of discriminators. The colors in the
simplices indicate the basins of attraction of the stable equilibria or a region in which
trajectories cycle around a neutral center. Unstable equilibria are indicated with white
circles, stable equilibria with black circles, saddles with half white and half black cir-
cles, and neutral centers with gray circles. If there is a stable cooperator-discriminator
equilibrium for pc = 0.5, this will persist for all values 0.5 < pc < 1, as seen in (A)-(D)
and (Q)-(T). If there is a stable interior equilibrium for pc = 0.5, this will persist for all
values 0.5 < pc < 1, as seen in (E)-(H). If there is a neutral equilibrium for pc = 0.5, this
can be either stabilized or destabilized by increasing pc when aint is greater than or less
than 1, respectively, as seen in (I)-(L) and (M)-(P). If there is a stable cooperator-defector
equilibrium for pc = 0.5, this will persist for all values of 0.5 ≤ pc ≤ 1, as seen in (U)-(X).
Caption continued below.
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Figure S4: Our model’s replicator dynamics do change at the extreme value of pc = 1. All
points on the cooperator-discriminator edge become neutral equilibria along that edge
of the simplex. Additionally, a stable interior equilibrium may collide with that edge of
the simplex and disappear, as seen in the transition from (K) to (L). The directions of
trajectories to or from the interior of the simplex remain unchanged: the upper part of
the edge attracts trajectories from the interior, while trajectories move away from points
on the lower part of the edge. This is indicated with points that are half gray and half
white or black, depending on whether trajectories from the interior approach or move
away from the edge there, respectively. Parameters: in A-D, aint = 0.93, ainf = 0.93; in E-
H, aint = 0.98, ainf = 0.98; in I-L, aint = 0.995, ainf = 0.9; in M-P, aint = 1.005, ainf = 1.005;
in Q-T, aint = 1.005, ainf = 1.17; in U-X, aint = 1.24, ainf = 1.17; in the left-most column,
pc = 0.5; in the second column, pc = 0.9; in the third column, pc = 0.97; in the right-most
column, pc = 1; in all panels, po = 0.85, pr = 0.95, R = 10, b = 10, c = 1, and s = 0.
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Figure S5: Caption below.
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Figure S5: Decreasing the probability pc of cooperating with unknown agents does not
change the existence or stability of a cooperator-discriminator equilibria. In the left
column, the phase portraits are as in Figure 1. The one difference is that, whereas in
Figure 1 we showed a neutral interior equilibrium for the single parameter combination
aint = ainf = 1, here we show two other parameter combinations that give rise to a neu-
tral interior equilibrium, the first with both assortment parameters less than 1 and the
second with both assortment parameters greater than 1. Moving from top to bottom,
from one panel to the next either one or both of the assortment parameters, aint and ainf,
increase. Moving from left to right, pc decreases until it equals 0. In each phase por-
trait, trajectories show how the frequencies of cooperators, defectors, and discriminators
change over time. The lower left corner of the simplex represents a group made up en-
tirely of cooperators, the lower right corner a group made up entirely of defectors, and
the upper corner a group made up entirely of discriminators. The colors in the simplices
indicate the basins of attraction of the stable equilibria or a region in which trajectories
cycle around a neutral center. Unstable equilibria are indicated with white circles, stable
equilibria with black circles, saddles with half white and half black circles, and neutral
centers with gray circles. If there is a stable cooperator-discriminator equilibrium for
pc = 0.5, this will persist for all values of 0 ≤ pc ≤ 0.5, as seen in (A)-(D) and (Q)-(T).
If there is a stable interior equilibrium for pc = 0.5, this will persist until very small
values of pc, at which the interior equilibrium is destabilized and all trajectories flow
toward the pure defector equilibrium, as seen in (E)-(H). If there is a neutral equilibrium
for pc = 0.5, this can become either destabilized or stabilized when aint is greater than
or less than 1, respectively, as seen in (I)-(L) and (M)-(P). If there is a stable cooperator-
defector equilibrium for pc = 0.5, this will persist for all values of 0 ≤ pc ≤ 0.5, as seen
in (U)-(X). Caption continued below.
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Figure S5: Our model’s replicator dynamics do change at the extreme value of pc =
0. All points on the defector-discriminator edge become neutral equilibria along that
edge of the simplex. The direction of trajectories to or from the interior of the simplex
remain unchanged: the lower part of the edge attracts trajectories from the interior, while
trajectories move away from points on the upper part of the edge. This is indicated with
points that are half gray and half white or black, depending on whether trajectories from
the interior approach or move away from the edge there, respectively. Parameters: in
A-D, aint = 0.93, ainf = 0.93; in E-H, aint = 0.98, ainf = 0.98; in I-L, aint = 0.995, ainf = 0.9;
in M-P, aint = 1.005, ainf = 1.005; in Q-T, aint = 1.005, ainf = 1.17; in U-X, aint = 1.24,
ainf = 1.17; in the left-most column, pc = 0.5; in the second column, pc = 0.1; in the third
column, pc = 0.03; in the right-most column, pc = 0; in all panels, po = 0.85, pr = 0.95,
R = 10, b = 10, c = 1, and s = 0.
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Figure S6: Caption below.
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Figure S6: Increasing the probability pc of cooperating with unknown agents does not
change the existence or stability of a cooperator-discriminator equilibrium. In the left
column, the phase portraits are as in Figure 2. Moving from top to bottom, the probabil-
ity pr of remembering increases. Moving from left to right, pc increases until it equals 1.
In each phase portrait, trajectories show how the frequencies of cooperators, defectors,
and discriminators change over time. The lower left corner of the simplex represents a
group made up entirely of cooperators, the lower right corner a group made up entirely
of defectors, and the upper corner a group made up entirely of discriminators. The col-
ors in the simplices indicate the basins of attraction of the stable equilibria or a region
in which trajectories cycle around a neutral center. Unstable equilibria are indicated
with white circles, stable equilibria with black circles, and saddles with half white and
half black circles. If there are no mixed equilibria for pc = 0.5, there will be no mixed
equilibria for any value 0.5 ≤ pc ≤ 1, as seen in (A)-(D). If there is a stable cooperator-
discriminator equilibrium for pc = 0.5, this will persist for all values 0.5 < pc < 1, as
seen in (E)-(H). If there is a stable interior equilibrium for pc = 0.5, this will persist for all
values 0.5 < pc < 1, as seen in (I)-(L). Our model’s replicator dynamics do change at the
extreme value of pc = 1. All points on the cooperator-discriminator edge become neutral
equilibria along that edge of the simplex. Additionally, a stable interior equilibrium may
collide with that edge of the simplex and disappear, as seen in the transition from (K) to
(L). The direction of trajectories to or from the interior of the simplex remain unchanged:
the upper part of the edge attracts trajectories from the interior, while trajectories move
away from points on the lower part of the edge. This is indicated with points that are
half gray and half white or black, depending on whether trajectories from the interior
approach or move away from the edge there, respectively. Caption continued below.
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Figure S6: Parameters: in A-D, pr = 0.25, po = 0.3; in E-H, pr = 0.6, po = 0.3; in I-L,
pr = 1, po = 0.3; in the left-most column, pc = 0.5; in the second column, pc = 0.6; in the
third column, pc = 0.9; in the right-most column, pc = 1; in all panels, aint = ainf = 0.93,
R = 10, b = 10, c = 1, pc = 0.5, and s = 0.
Figure S7: Caption below.
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Figure S7: Decreasing the probability pc of cooperating with unknown agents does not
change the existence or stability of a cooperator-discriminator equilibria. In the left col-
umn, the phase portraits are as in Figure 2. Moving from top to bottom, the probability
pr of remembering increases. Moving from left to right, pc decreases until it equals 0.
In each phase portrait, trajectories show how the frequencies of cooperators, defectors,
and discriminators change over time. The lower left corner of the simplex represents a
group made up entirely of cooperators, the lower right corner represents a group made
up entirely of defectors, and the upper corner represents a group made up entirely of
discriminators. The colors in the simplices indicate the basins of attraction of the stable
equilibria or a region in which trajectories cycle around a neutral center. Unstable equi-
libria are indicated with white circles, stable equilibria with black circles, and saddles
with half white and half black circles. If there are no mixed equilibria for pc = 0.5, then
there will be no mixed equilibria for any value 0 ≤ pc ≤ 0.5, as seen in (A)-(D). If there is
a stable cooperator-discriminator equilibrium for pc = 0.5, this will persist for all values
0 ≤ pc ≤ 0.5, as seen in (E)-(H). If there is a stable interior equilibrium for pc = 0.5, this
will persist until a value of about pc = 0.4, at which the interior equilibrium is destabi-
lized and all trajectories flow toward the pure defector equilibrium, as seen in (I)-(L). Our
model’s replicator dynamics do change at the extreme value of pc = 0. All points on the
defector-discriminator edge become neutral equilibria along that edge of the simplex.
The direction of trajectories to or from the interior of the simplex remain unchanged:
the lower part of the edge attracts trajectories from the interior, while trajectories move
away from points on the upper part of the edge. This is indicated with points that are
half gray and half white or black, depending on whether trajectories from the interior
approach or move away from the edge there, respectively. Caption continued below.
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Figure S7: Parameters: in A-D, pr = 0.25, po = 0.3; in E-H, pr = 0.6, po = 0.3; in I-L,
pr = 1, po = 0.3; in the left-most column, pc = 0.5; in the second column, pc = 0.4; in the
third column, pc = 0.1; in the right-most column, pc = 0; in all panels, aint = ainf = 0.93,
R = 10, b = 10, c = 1, pc = 0.5, and s = 0.
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Figure S8: Our results are qualitatively similar when the benefit b of receiving a donation
is reduced. In the main text, we use b = 10. In the top row of this figure, we use
b = 5, and in the bottom row, we use b = 2. (A) and (C) are identical to the main
panel of Figure 1 in the main text, except for the change in b and slightly lower values
of po and pr. In these panels, we show how the replicator dynamics depend on the
degrees of information assortment ainf and interaction assortment aint. The axes are
scaled logarithmically. The dashed line shows where ainf = aint. Regardless of the value
of b, we find that assortment, either in information or in interaction, is necessary, but not
sufficient, to stabilize cooperation. Caption continued below.
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Figure S8: (B) and (D) are identical to the main panel of Figure 2 in the main text, except
for the change in b. In these panels, we thus show how our model’s replicator dynamics
depend on the probabilities po of observing and pr of remembering. The horizontal axis
extends until po = ainf, beyond which po is not meaningful (see the Supporting Infor-
mation, Section S1). Regardless of the value of b, even limited information can stabilize
cooperation and increasing the amount of information can jeopardize cooperation. In
each panel, the parameter space is colored according to the most cooperative outcome
of the replicator dynamics that occurs for a given combination of these parameters. A
group made up entirely of defectors is always a stable equilibrium. In a red region, it is
the only stable equilibrium. In a white region, it is the only stable equilibrium, although
a neutral interior equilibrium exists. In a dark-blue region, there is a stable cooperator-
discriminator equilibrium. In a light-blue region, there is a stable equilibrium at which
with all three types are present. In a purple region, there is a stable cooperator-defector
equilibrium. In (C) and (D), a narrow light-blue region exists between the dark-blue and
white regions, which is too small to see at the shown scale. In (C), a stable cooperator-
defector equilibrium, indicated by the purple region in (A), appears beyond aint = 3.
Parameters: in A and B, b = 5; in C and D, b = 2, in A and C, pr = 0.8, po = 0.8; in B
and D, aint = 0.93, ainf = 0.93; in all panels, aint = ainf = 0.93, R = 10, c = 1, pc = 0.5,
and s = 0.
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